Initial thesis: "The war benefits everyone except ordinary people — Ukraine's leadership (holding onto power, Western money), Russia's leadership (global agenda), Western countries (buying their way out with money so the war stays there, not in Europe, and dragging it out, thereby weakening their main adversary — Russia)."
The thesis is exaggerated — but there's a kernel of truth in it. The war in Ukraine is in its fifth year, a million Ukrainians are in the army, ten million are refugees, 300 to 700 thousand Russians have been killed or severely wounded (there's no precise figure, and there won't be). These aren't abstract GDP percentages — these are concrete fates. But the question "who benefits from this" is legitimate. The answer is more complex than "everyone's to blame," and definitely doesn't fit into a slogan.
In this essay I'll break down each point of the thesis, try to find evidence and counter-evidence, look at the situation from different angles — including those who aren't in the original thesis at all: Ukrainian and Russian societies. And at the end I'll honestly say what's confirmed and what's not.
This is the only part of the thesis that's confirmed almost without reservations. The numbers speak for themselves.
Global context. According to SIPRI, global military spending in 2024 grew 9.4 percent — to $2.72 trillion. This is the sharpest annual growth since the end of the Cold War, and almost entirely driven by the war in Ukraine. Ukraine became the world's largest arms importer: 8.8 percent of the global market in 2020–2024 versus 0.1 percent in 2015–2019. That's growth of 9,627 percent — a figure that sounds like a diagnosis in itself.
Concrete winners. These aren't abstract "corporations," these are specific companies with specific owners.
Palantir Technologies. An American software company that since 2022 has embedded its systems into Ukrainian military command — intelligence processing, drone coordination, logistics. Capitalization: $13 billion (end of 2022) → $443 billion (peak in August 2025). Growth of 3,300 percent in two and a half years. For comparison: the S&P 500 over the same period grew about 50 percent. Palantir's founder and CEO — Alex Karp, a former German philosopher with leftist views who became one of the war's biggest beneficiaries. In May 2026 he personally attended an exhibition of Ukrainian drones in Kyiv with the then-defense minister Fedorov.
Anduril Industries. Manufacturer of autonomous drones and AI systems. Active in Ukraine since the start of the conflict. Company valuation: $14 billion (2024) → $30.5 billion (2025). In their last round they raised $2.5 billion, of which $1 billion came from Peter Thiel's Founders Fund. In other words, Peter Thiel (co-founder of PayPal, Palantir, first outside investor in Facebook) — is one of this war's biggest beneficiaries through his investments.
AeroVironment. Produces Switchblade drones actively used by Ukraine's Armed Forces. Capitalization: $2 billion (February 2022) → $13 billion (July 2025). Six-fold growth.
Shield AI. Developer of autonomous drones. Partner of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces. Valuation: over $1 billion (end of 2021) → $5.3 billion. Five-fold growth.
Zone 5 Technologies. A small California UAV manufacturer, founded in 2011, just 22 employees in 2022. By end of 2024 — already 65 employees, an $825 million contract to supply ERAM missiles for Ukraine. This is a textbook example of how war creates growth opportunities for small players.
Aggregate indicators. The S&P Aerospace & Defense Index has grown nearly 90 percent since the start of the war, significantly outpacing the overall market. Number of publicly traded defense funds in the US: 4 (2022) → 27 (2025). Assets under management: grew nine-fold, exceeding $35 billion. This means that not only weapons manufacturers invested in the war, but also average American investors through pension funds.
Europe as "arbitrage." At the NATO summit in The Hague (June 2025), member countries pledged to raise defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035 — that's 150 percent growth from the previous 2 percent benchmark. At a meeting on July 14, 2025, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and US President Donald Trump agreed that European countries and Canada would purchase $10 billion of American weapons for Ukraine or to replenish their own stockpiles under the PURL initiative. Each package — about $500 million; the first came from the Netherlands ($500 million for artillery and ammunition, August 4), then a joint package from Denmark, Norway and Sweden ($500 million, August 5), Germany ($500 million, August 13), Canada ($500 million, August 24).
Ironic nuance. Lockheed Martin and RTX in 2023 spent $18.9 billion on stock buybacks — while only $4.1 billion on capital expenditures. In other words, profits from military orders go not to expanding capacity (which is needed to continue the war), but to enriching shareholders. Former US Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel: "The US defense industry is a greater risk to American security than China." Former Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro: "You can't ask the American taxpayer to increase investment while you continue to inflate your stock prices through buybacks."
What this means for the thesis. Western defense industry — beneficiary #1, this isn't disputed. Eisenhower himself in his 1961 farewell address warned: the "military-industrial complex" creates incentives for continuing conflicts. The situation of 2022–2026 is empirical confirmation of his words. Eisenhower spoke of a threat; now we see its realization. And in a situation where another country is fighting directly — while corporations receive profits without bearing political risks of escalation. This is an ideal business model: "war without our boys."
This is the most subtle part of the thesis, and here there's the most speculation. Let's break it down point by point.
What's documentably confirmed.
First. "Attrition logic" — the idea that Russia can be weakened through continuing the war without NATO's direct participation, is openly discussed in Western think tanks. This isn't a hidden motive — it's public strategy. The formulation "as long as it takes" has been standard for Western leaders since 2022. RAND Corporation in June 2025 writes directly: "Europe has no 'theory of success' regarding the end goal of its policy toward Russia." In other words — there's no publicly articulated victory strategy, there's only a strategy of continuing support. This can be interpreted as a depletion strategy: don't let Russia win and wait until internal problems (economy, society) force it to retreat.
Second. "Arbitrage" favoring the US — documentably confirmed fact. The US sells weapons to Europe, which buys them for Ukraine or to replenish its own stockpiles. This benefits American defense industry (see point 1) and is geopolitically beneficial — the US maintains control over European security through dependence on American weapons. RAND notes: after the decline of American presence in Europe (Trump in February 2025 made it clear that Europe is no longer a US priority — priorities are China and the border), Europeans will have to either spend huge sums on their own defense or remain dependent on American supplies. Both options benefit American defense industry.
Third. Defense budget growth — domestic political bonus for governments. In France, Germany, Poland, Great Britain, right-wing parties use the theme "finally spending on defense" as an election slogan. In the US, Republicans in Congress regularly demand increased military budgets precisely because of Ukraine and China.
What's speculative or unconfirmed.
"Dragging it out for the sake of weakening" — formally there's no document where a Western government says "it benefits us for the war to last longer." On the contrary, Western leaders regularly say they want "just peace." But actions speak louder than words: Western governments don't insist on immediate ceasefire negotiations, despite numerous diplomatic opportunities. Every time "red lines" or "peace formulas" are formulated, they're softened or postponed.
"Buying their way out with money" — this is simplification. Western aid to Ukraine isn't just paying off, it's investment in their own security (at least in voters' perception). But the price of this "investment" — Ukrainian lives, which makes it morally vulnerable to criticism. And there's an internal contradiction: if Western governments truly believe they're helping "defend democracy," why don't they insist on more decisive action — for example, lifting restrictions on strikes deep into Russia, supplying fighter jets, air defense systems? Isn't it because the current model — is better for domestic politics than quick victory or quick peace?
Counter-argument. If Western governments really wanted to weaken Russia, sanctions would be much harsher. A complete embargo on Russian energy, which was discussed in 2022, was never imposed — because dependence on Russian gas (especially in Eastern Europe) made it politically impossible. Part of Western governments (Hungary, Slovakia, until recently Austria) openly resisted tightening. This means that "there's no unified weakening strategy" — there are different positions, and they negotiate with each other.
What this means for the thesis. Western governments indeed use the war as an opportunity for: (1) defense industry growth, (2) strengthening their own geopolitical position, (3) domestic political bonuses. But "Russia-weakening strategy" — is more a side effect and implicit consequence than an open goal. This is a strategy that's more convenient not to articulate — because any explicit formulation creates political risks.
This is the most sensitive part of the original thesis. Here we need to speak directly but with understanding of context.
Current situation (August 19–22, 2026). Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office conducted searches at the office of Deputy Head of the President's Office Iryna Mudra and a people's deputy. The operation received the code name "Operation Forrest Gump" — by analogy with the famous screenplay "run to the finish." The investigation involves money laundering through a scheme connected to presidential staff. Zelenskyy's press secretary stated that the searches are "a blow to the political system during war." After this, Zelenskyy fired one of his closest associates.
In parallel — an open political crisis. On August 19, ex-defense minister Mykhailo Fedorov (35 years old, technocrat, under Zelenskyy responsible for logistics, innovation and anti-corruption) published a 9-minute YouTube address calling for presidential elections during the war. According to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (poll from late July 2026):
Ex-foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba supported the idea: "Elections after the war won't be more civilized than during it. What if the war lasts another three years? Will we live under the 2019 political model that's already emotionally exhausted."
Razumkov Center data (November 2025). This is the most representative opinion poll in Ukraine. 2,008 respondents, 22 regions, margin of error 2.3 percent. What does this poll show?
The highest level of trust — in Ukraine's Armed Forces (92 percent), State Emergency Service (86 percent), volunteer organizations (81 percent), volunteer units (78 percent). Trust in Zelenskyy as president is at 48 percent "trust" versus 45 percent "don't trust" — meaning roughly evenly split.
But the main thing — trust in anti-corruption bodies has grown over the past year thanks to precisely these exposures: NABU is now trusted by 45 percent (versus 41 not trusting). A year ago the balance was worse. This means that the anti-corruption vertical is working: people see that it investigates even the president's circle, and this increases trust in it.
Regarding perception of the country's direction: 32.5 percent believe events are developing in the right direction, 48 percent — in the wrong direction, 19.6 percent — undecided. This is better than before the war (20 percent "right" in December 2021), but significantly worse than the 2023 peak (61 percent). There's a steady downward trend since 2023 — which is quite natural for a society tired of war.
Main problems of Ukrainian society (according to Razumkov, November 2025):
What this means for the thesis. The thesis claims that Ukrainian leadership "stays in power" thanks to the war. This is simplification, but not completely false. Several facts:
First. Ukraine's Constitution directly prohibits elections during war. This formally legitimizes delay — but not through Zelenskyy's fault. This is a constitutional norm adopted back in 2015, before his presidency.
Second. Demand for turnover exists and is visible. Zelenskyy's rating fell from 73 percent in 2019 to 56 percent (and that's before the fresh Mudra scandal). Fedorov and Zaluzhny surpass him. This is atypical for a "regime staying in power" — in regimes staying in power, the leader's rating either falls but is blocked by apparatus, or conversely is maintained through propaganda. Here we see open political pressure on the president from elites and society.
Third. Corruption is real, and it's systemic. NABU finds schemes even in the president's circle. But this isn't a distinguishing feature of a "regime staying in power," this is a feature of any post-Soviet state with weakened institutions, especially in wartime conditions.
Fourth. Anti-corruption bodies are working. A year ago NABU was distrusted more than trusted. Now — the opposite. This indicates that the system isn't suppressed but is working — which again is incompatible with the "regime staying in power" model.
Bottom line. The "staying in power" thesis — partially confirmed, but with serious caveats. War indeed postponed elections. Corruption in Zelenskyy's circle indeed exists. But demand for turnover is visible, anti-corruption bodies are working, the president's rating is falling, and political opposition openly demands elections. This isn't characteristic of a stable authoritarian regime — this is characteristic of democracy in wartime conditions.
This is the most controversial point of the thesis. Here I'll rely mainly on two sources: SIPRI (March 2026, on military budget) and CSIS (August 22, 2026 — two days ago, on public sentiment).
Military budget. According to SIPRI, Russia's military spending in 2025 was 16 trillion rubles, 7.5 percent of GDP. Real spending growth slowed: from 38 percent in 2024 to 6.1 percent in 2025. The 2025 budget deficit — 2.6 percent of GDP. Planned 2026 spending — 14.9 trillion rubles, 6.3 percent of GDP. The reduction is explained by "stricter financial management methods" of the Ministry of Defense and savings on weapons procurement.
This is important: reducing military spending by 1.2 percent of GDP — is a sign of overheating, not success. The economy can't endlessly spend 7.5 percent of GDP on war without structural problems. SIPRI writes directly: "an attempt to restore balance to an economy overheated by military spending."
The 2026 budget will likely be revised during the year (this already happened twice in 2025). The war with Iran, started by Israel and the US in early 2026, will likely lead to rising oil prices — which, ironically, will ease Russia's budget situation. Foreign policy shocks become an unforeseen source of income.
Public sentiment. Here CSIS gives an extremely interesting picture based on data from Levada Center, ExtremeScan, Gallup and IKAR (data from July–August 2026):
Attacks on refineries. Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russian oil refineries (so-called "long-range sanctions") — this is a new factor. They're simultaneously military strikes and economic pressure: long lines at gas stations from Moscow to Irkutsk, diesel shortages during peak summer farming season, threat of harvest failure. According to Levada, refinery strikes became the most mentioned event of May and June 2026 (16 and 24 percent of respondents respectively).
CSIS formulates it this way: "long lines at gas stations" — this is a rare moment when the causal chain from starting the war to fuel crisis becomes understandable to ordinary Russians. But the question remains open: who will they blame — the Kremlin or external enemies? This is competition for meaning, and Russian and Western information efforts can play a role in it.
What this means for the thesis. The thesis claims that war benefits Russian leadership because it "keeps the whole world in its agenda." This is partially true — but with significant caveats.
Yes, the Russian regime gets short-term benefits from continuing the war:
But there are serious counter-arguments:
SIPRI clearly speaks of overheating: 7.5 percent of GDP on war — this is a price society pays, not "profit."
CSIS shows trend toward war fatigue: Putin's approval rating is falling, trust in army and government is falling, 81 percent of Russians support ending the war "tomorrow." This doesn't look like a society rallied around a military regime — this looks like a society that's tired.
The Russian regime is in the "last battle" trap: continuing the war is economically destructive, but stopping without "victory" will create a threat to the regime (loss of legitimacy, risk of "color revolutions" that RAND mentions in the context of Russian fears). This is a dilemma, not a strategy.
Irony of the situation: the war with Iran (Israel + US against Iran, beginning of 2026), which objectively benefits Russia (rising oil prices), happens without Russia's participation. This isn't "influence," this is luck. Russia doesn't control the global agenda — it reacts to events shaped by others.
The most telling thing about the original thesis — who's not in it.
Ukrainian society. Ten million refugees, a million in the army, destroyed infrastructure. Ukrainian GDP contracted by a third in 2022 and still hasn't fully recovered. Cedos research "Three Years of Full-Scale War" (262 respondents, February–April 2025) shows a picture of chronic uncertainty and anxiety:
Russian society. According to CSIS, there's erosion of public consensus around the war in Russia. Loyalists (35–40 percent) are starting to lose interest in the war. Economic shocks — rising prices, fuel shortages — are having their effect. 81 percent support ending the war "tomorrow." Putin's approval rating is falling even by pro-government polls. Hidden mobilization (when the state doesn't officially declare but actively recruits through military enlistment offices) hasn't yet met mass resistance, but there's been no enthusiasm for a long time.
Global South. The 2022–2023 food crisis caused by the blockade of Ukrainian ports and disruption of supply chains hit Africa and the Middle East. The war exacerbated migration flows to Europe. Rising energy prices in 2022–2023 hit developing economies.
Ukrainian defense industry. This is an unexpected beneficiary not mentioned in the original thesis. Ukrainian defense startups (Swarmer, Tencore, Osavul, Kara Dag and others) attracted $40 million in 2023–2024 (compared to $5 million in 2023) and, according to forecasts, will reach $100 million by end of 2025. All investments go through BRAVE1 — a state defense-tech initiative. In July 2025, Ukraine and the EU launched BraveTech EU — a joint €100 million program to integrate Ukraine's defense tech sector into European industry. AeroVironment opened production of Switchblade 600 drones in Ukraine.
This is a qualitatively new type of beneficiary: Ukrainian startups that turn war into R&D. They get investments, test technologies on the battlefield, and then scale them to the global market. Ukraine is becoming "the world's autonomous drone laboratory" — and this gives it an economic resource independent of Western military aid.
After analyzing each point, I'd reformulate the original thesis this way:
"The war benefits narrow interest groups on each side, and each group has its own logic. But 'ordinary people' aren't one group but several different groups with different interests, and not all of them are losing."
What's confirmed:
What's not confirmed or is speculative:
The most important observation:
Even if all four groups (defense industry, Russian regime, Ukrainian political class, Western governments) benefit, this doesn't mean they coordinate. Western defense industry earns money but doesn't control Western government decisions. Ukrainian political class steals but didn't unleash the war (the war started with Russia's invasion). The Russian regime uses the war but didn't want it precisely now (the FSB received reports about Ukraine's unpreparedness for invasion, and they were ignored). Rather this is coincidence of interests than conspiracy. Which, however, doesn't make the situation less dangerous — because coincidence of interests creates gravitational pull toward continuation: each side has incentives to continue, and no one has incentives to stop.